We study decentralized trade in dynamic markets with homogeneous, non-atomic, buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit. In the first part of the paper we characterize equilibrium in a bargaining model with two-sided time varying outside options. In the second part we analyze a market equilibrium model in which (i) buyers and sellers are randomly matched in pairs; (ii) each buyer-seller pair bargains over the price of a good; and (iii) each agent has the option of abandoning negotiations, in which case the value of returning to the pool of unmatched agents constitutes an outside option. The second part is therefore an application of the first part in which the values of the outside options are endogenous to the model. Conditions for uniqueness of the market equilibrium are given; when it is unique it converges to the Walrasian outcome as frictions vanish. To the extent that multiplicity of market equilibria may (under some conditions) persist as frictions are removed, the limit of some sequences of equilibrium prices may converge to nonWalrasian values.
1 Introduction [1985] [1998] [1998] Models of bargaining in non-stationary environments, as Merlo and Wilson , and Coles and Muthoo , do not explicitly consider the possibility that bargainers opt out.
The ultimatum pro le is generally not the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, though; other subgame perfect equilibria can prevail when the combined values of the anticipated outside options of both bargainers are not too great.
This paper is a contribution to the theory of price formation in markets with decentralized trade and bargaining, focusing on the distinctive implications of voluntary search. We consider an economy à la Rubinstein and Wolinsky where homogeneous buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit are randomly matched in pairs, and each pair bargains over the price at which to trade. Each period, agents that trade leave the market, agents that fail to trade stay and new agents enter. Buyer-seller pairs play an alternating offer bargaining game. Upon rejection of an offer, both players may quit the match. If one player quits a match, then both she and her partner return to the pool of traders that will be randomly matched in the following period. If neither decides to search for an alternative partner, they remain matched and continue bargaining. Thus, bargaining is an in nite horizon game with two-sided outside options, the market options, whose value over time is determined by the strategies of traders throughout the market. Markets that remain stationary as the ow of entry exactly matches the measure of consummated trades are only a particular case; generally non-stationary market equilibria must be considered. When a market is non-stationary, the value of the market options varies over time.
Bargaining games with two-sided outside options that change over time have not been studied in the literature . Consequently, the rst step of our analysis is to characterize subgame perfect equilibria in such bargaining games. We provide such a characterization and subsequently build on it as we focus our attention on market equilibria. Equilibria for games with two-sided outside options of constant value are characterized in Ponsatí and Sákovics . Their fundamental insight is that (although the bargaining protocol permits an in nite sequence of alternating proposals) the set of subgame perfect equilibria always contains a pro le of ultimatum strategies, namely one in which the proposer offers the responder a share of value equal to the outside option, and she accepts. We show that the main arguments of Ponsatí time. Hence the existence of an equilibrium in ultimatum strategies can still be assured, allowing an analogous characterization of the equilibrium for the more general environment. The observation that bargaining games admit an equilibrium in ultimatum strategies has important implications as we consider market equilibria: The use of ultimatum strategies by all traders in a market results in a unique sequence of market options. Under this endogenous sequence of market options, playing ultimatum strategies is a subgame perfect equilibrium for all bargaining pairs. Therefore a market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies always exists For an important subset of environments it is the unique market equilibrium: In fact, in spite of the (potentially) large set of subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining game, the endogenous nature of the market options drastically limits the range of market equilibria. In stationary markets, for instance, the market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies prevails uniquely when search and bargaining costs are not too high (and coincides with the unique equilibrium in Rubinstein and Wolinsky as long as search costs are independent of bargaining costs). In non-stationary environments, if search costs are low and players are impatient, then the market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies prevails as the unique market equilibrium as well. In general, however, if players are not too impatient a continuum of market equilibria exists and a non-degenerate interval of equilibrium prices can be supported.
In non-stationary markets, as frictions vanish, prices along the market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies approach the Walrasian price, an asymptotic prediction consistent with the results of Binmore and Herrero and Gale . Nevertheless, multiple equilibria can persist in the limit provided that frictions vanish along a path where search costs stay higher than bargaining costs. Consequently, there exist sequences of market equilibria where, as frictions vanish, prices fail to converge to the Walrasian price.
The non-cooperative foundations of Walrasian and/or efficient outcomes in markets where trade takes place in decentralized pair-wise meetings is a fundamental issue that has been the object of important contributions and heated controversy. Our model is most closely related to Binmore and Herrero that addresses, as we do, non-steady states for markets with non-atomic and homogeneous agents. The main difference is their assumption that all active agents participate in the matching process each period. Since search is not voluntary in their model, their bargaining pairs effectively play an ultimatum game, and thus their unique equilibrium is closely related to our market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies. Search is voluntary in the models of Gale Wolinsky Bester and Muthoo among others. While these contributions discuss a large variety of environments, they share two main features. First, the message that, as frictions disappear, market equilibria converge to the Walrasian outcome. And second, the assumption that players cannot break up a bargaining match in periods where they act as the proposer. As weak as such a constraint might appear, it is not. Shaked sharply makes this point in a model where a unique seller confronts many buyers; only the seller can quit bargaining and she can do it while being the proposer. Shaked s model yields a continuum of market equilibria (provided that the search costs of the seller are neither too small nor too large); multiple equilibria (some with prices well above the Walrasian price) remain as frictions vanish.
Our model bridges the gap between Shaked and the rest of the literature since we consider markets where proposers can exit without delay, but we rule out market power (there is a continuum of buyers and a continuum of sellers) and strategic asymmetries (our bargaining games treat traders symmetrically). Away from the drastic asymmetries of Shaked s set up, we can establish natural conditions assuring that the Walrasian outcome prevails uniquely as frictions vanish. However, we can also display natural environments where the right to quit of proposers remains the source of multiple market equilibria, even in the limit.
In as much as frictionless markets are identi ed with the Walrasian outcome, we must conclude that this identi cation is tantamount to the assertion that agents play ultimatum strategies. While our ndings support ultimatum games as a reduced form of more complex bargaining games, they also point out that this simplifying approach overlooks interesting (and asymptotically persistent) equilibria.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes subgame perfect equilibria of alternating offer bargaining games with two-sided time-varying outside options. Section 
Symmetric results hold in the opposite case. Since entry ows are stationary, assuming that the initial short side is also the short side in the entry process is almost without loss of generality. If entry were higher in the initial short side, it would remain the short side only for nitely many periods. 4 characterizes market equilibria in non-stationary environments. Steady states are characterized in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Consider a market where trade is carried out by decentralized agreements of buyer-seller pairs that meet randomly over time and negotiate the price to trade one unit of an indivisible good. Time is measured in discrete equally spaced periods and players discount the future with a common discount parameter If a pair trades the good at price in period , the seller obtains payoff and the buyer obtains . There is a continuum of buyers and sellers. That is, there are initial measures of buyers and sellers and and a constant ow of entry of buyers and sellers, and Formally, the set of buyers in the market, denoted by is and the set of sellers is
The state of the market at , is the pair of measures of buyers and sellers searching for a partner at the beginning of each date . Without loss of generality, we assume that sellers are initially the short side of the market, and and that Given the initial populations, as traders leave the market in buyer-seller pairs, sellers remain the short side of the market. Thus as unless and this measure coincides with the measure of realized trades (i.e. as in Rubinstein and Wolinsky ), the market cannot remain stationary and . At each period unmatched sellers and buyers meet at random. The probabilities of nding a trading counterpart at are denoted and respectively for buyers and sellers. For the sake Our results are robust to more general formulations. A reasonable alternative is to assume that decreases in that is, as sellers become (relatively) increasingly scarce and buyers increasingly abundant, sellers nd a match more easily.
The decisions to break a match after a proposal is rejected may be sequential or simultaneous. See discussion in section 3.
Assuming that is common to all players is without loss of generality because the of simplicity, when discussing non-stationary environments we assume that sellers nd a match with a constant probability, and that buyers meet a seller with probability . Search frictions are said to vanish if the probability that sellers nd a match approaches one, When a buyer and a seller meet, they play an alternating proposals bargaining game to set a price for the good. Each is selected to act as rst proposer with probability Acceptance of a proposal ends the game, agents trade and leave the market. Upon rejection, the bargaining pair may continue bargaining if both wish to do so; otherwise, either may break the match and then both return to the pool of unmatched agents. Thus, the bargaining game has two-sided outside options which are (potentially) time varying and endogenously determined as the present value of reentering the pool of unmatched agents.
Since there is a continuum of buyers and sellers, agents that quit bargaining pairs prior to trade nd their previous partners with probability , so that, without loss of generality, we can assume that each bargaining pair plays a game that is independent of the history of the agents in previous meetings. A speci es actions (a proposed price/a decision to accept or reject/a decision to stay or leave the match) for each subgame. Consequently the value of the outside options to a player in a given bargaining pair is unaffected by her own (or the opponent s) bargaining strategy . Thus, from the point of view of each bargaining pair, market outside options can be taken as exogenous.
of a bargaining game are pairs of bargaining strategies that are best response to each other at each subgame.
A is a (measurable) function specifying a bargaining strategy for each buyer where denotes the set of bargaining strategies. A actions available at each subgame remain constant through bargaining games that differ in their initial date and outside options. Of course, for an agent i.e. one that enters the market at , a bargaining strategy speci es actions only at subgames with dates .
denoted is de ned similarly, as
A pair is a . Note that the previous definitions implicitly assume that the same bargaining strategy is used in all bargaining games that a trader might play, and that bargaining strategies are not contingent on the opponent s identity. Given a market pro le the measure of agents that trade at and the (distribution of) prices at which these trades occur are uniquely determined -depending only on the bargaining strategies played by subsets of active traders that have positive measure. For each buyer (seller ), the given the market pro le , denoted (respectively ), is the expected value of opting out from a bargaining pair at when all agents play according to the market pro le of strategies thereafter. A market pro le is a if and only if, for all , and for almost all pairs that are active in the market at along the strategy pair is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game with outside options . Two special cases are important: at a (almost) all buyers use the same bargaining strategy and so do all sellers; at an (almost) all bargaining pairs reach an immediate agreement. At a uniform market pro le all buyers/sellers that initiate bargaining at the same date have the same market option at , for all At a the outside options are identity independent; that is, for all and for all . When a uniform immediate agreement pro le is a market equilibrium we will say that the associate market options are the . Consequently, an arbitrary sequence is a sequence of market equilibrium options if there is a uniform immediate agreement pro le such that and for all , and is a market equilibrium. Addressing situations in which buyer-seller pairs play an alternating offers bargaining game with endogenous and time varying outside options [1998]
ultimatum strategy
3 Bargaining with two-sided, time-varying, outside options
The case of uncertain outside options is discussed in Ponsatí and Sákovics and Ponsatí and Sákovics demands a characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes with exogenous time varying outside options. A detailed discussion of bargaining games with exogenous, time invariant, and certain options that can be taken at all times by both players is in Ponsatí and Sákovics . In what follows we consider the more general case of two-sided outside options that are given by in nite sequences of known values.
Consider an alternating proposal bargaining game à la Rubinstein, where upon any rejection both players can opt out and terminate the game. Payoffs upon agreement are as usual. When one player opts out, then both players receive the outside option. The values of the outside options are given by a pair of in nite sequences , where denotes the outside option at of the player chosen to be the rst proposer (respectively, denotes the option of the rst responder). Specifying the timing (sequential or simultaneous) of exit decisions completes the description of the bargaining game with two-sided and time varying outside options.
We assume that the sequences of outside options satisfy for both players and all . This is a most natural assumption: a player always has the option at of waiting for the option that comes at , and this option has value at thus must be a lower bound of the outside options of player at .
Observe that if at some , equilibrium requires that players take their options at that . Then the game turns effectively into one with a nite horizon, and the (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are obtained by a straightforward backward induction. Consequently, in what follows we restrict attention to the case that for all . When the strategy of agent is such that she always proposes and takes the outside option upon any rejection of her opponent, we will say that she plays an . An agent that uses an ultimatum strategy chooses proposals as if she was in an ultimatum game, where any rejection automatically terminates the game. The key observation that If player proposes at , immediate agreement on is an outcome that can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium.
drives our results is the following simple but powerful lemma, that applies independently of the speci c timing of exit decisions. It says that an equilibrium in ultimatum strategies always exists.
The following ultimatum strategy pro le is a subgame perfect equilibrium. If Player is the proposer he always asks for ; the responder accepts any proposal that is not worse than the (candidate) equilibrium proposal; if the proposer asks for more, then the responder rejects and takes her outside option. Upon any rejection the proposer opts out.
Note rst that in anticipation of a period offer that pays the proposers decision to opt out at upon rejection of any proposal is optimal since ; and observe that this holds regardless of the speci c sequence of exit decisions. Since the proposer s decision to opt out leaves the responder at her outside option as well, the acceptance of a proposal that pays the value of the outside option is optimal; while the responder s decision about exit is irrelevant. It is then optimal that the proposer demands as much as Consequently, immediate agreement at is an outcome that can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium for all speci cations of the game.
The driving force behind Lemma 1 is the ability of the proposer to opt out in the same time period that her proposal is rejected, combined with the alternation in proposer-responder roles. Proposers can make a demand and threaten to leave if it is rejected. The credibility of such threat depends on the proposer s expected value if she continues bargaining next period, and not on the value of the rejected demand. When the proposer s threat can be sustained, the responder must accept any proposal that pays at least as much as her outside option. If outside options were taken by the decision of one player only, her threat to opt out would not be credible unless her outside option was sufficiently valuable -because staying after a rejection she would obtain a reasonable payoff even as a responder. But in our formulation the current responder is next period s proposer (and has the ability to threaten in the continuation). Hence in an ultimatun pro le the current proposer expects little if bargaining continues and the most extreme demand can be sustained with a credible threat. In summary, the ability of both players to opt out without delay when their proposal is 
Provided that staying implies the continuation of bargaining after rejection, of course. If the responder opts out at rejection, staying is weakly a best response.
Consider (sub)games starting at where Player is the proposer. i) If player can obtain a payoff in a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if
. ii) If in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome player offers to and she accepts.
rejected grants credibility to mutual threats to do so, and eliminates any bargaining power of the responders beyond the outside option.
What other strategy pro les be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium? The outside options are a lower bound to the payoffs that agents attain in subgame perfect equilibria. Consequently, if the outside options are sufficiently valuable, Lemma 1 describes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, because the unique best response of the proposer upon the hypothetical rejection of any proposal is to opt out. When the options have low value, however, other subgame perfect equilibria -in which players do not use the ultimatum strategies of Lemma 1 -are possible. Along such equilibria responders obtain payoffs strictly above their (low) outside option; therefore a proposer that sees her proposal rejected expects more than the outside option value if she stays in the negotiation for another period. As proposers cannot credibly threaten to opt out, responders obtain the continuation value of staying in the negotiation for another period, which indeed is strictly greater than the outside option value. Therefore, under outside options of low value, there is a continuum of equilibria.
The range of payoffs that a player can attain in equilibrium must surely be contained in the interval between her outside option value and her ultimatum share. But not all the values of this interval can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium. The precise range is given in Proposition 2 that follows.
If there are equilibria with outcomes different from that of Lemma 1, they must be such that players remain in the match upon rejection of some proposals.
Fix a subgame perfect equilibrium and assume that there is a subgame at which, when the proposal of player is rejected, stays at . Let denote an equilibrium payoff of the responder at Our rst observation is that since cannot expect more than the (1 )
For each equilibrium payoff we have exhibited a strategy pro le that sustains it in which agreement is immediate. Equilibrium pro les where agreement is delayed can also be constructed.
The existence of equilibria with delay is a standard feature of bargaining games admitting an interval of equilibrium payoffs. As this is not our main interest we skip further discussion.
See Shaked and Sutton discounted value of the maximum payoff that she can obtain while acting as the proposer in the following period: is an upper bound to the shares that can expect from in period ; but this upper bound is not attained if is below -because otherwise would surely take the outside option upon any rejection (by ) at . Now, by assumption, so that . Hence, it is necessary that Consider now player s exit decision upon rejection at : if she stays (to be a responder at ) she can expect no more than , therefore if i.e. then must necessarily take the outside option at upon any rejection; contradicting the alleged equilibrium behavior. Hence the existence of equilibrium outcomes different from those of Lemma 1 requires that . This proves ii). We now check that, when the game starts at and acts as the proposer, if then for all there is a subgame perfect equilibrium that yields a share to . Payoffs outside this interval cannot be sustained. The upper bound is immediate since can opt out and get . The lower bound follows by the arguments of the preceding paragraph since and imply that
To complete the proof it suffices to check that the following strategies are a subgame perfect equilibrium, for each . As proposer, player offers a share to player . In its turn, player accepts any share greater or equal to . If player rejects a proposal, stays in the game, and opts out if and only if the rejected proposal offered a share greater or equal to . In the continuation that follows s rejection a subgame perfect equilibrium sustaining the extreme outcome of Lemma 1 is played.
In summary, the outside option principle -that outside options of small 
Market Equilibria
The subindex in is omitted for simplicity.
x , x
x a x a a x x a a value are irrelevant so that the (unique) outcome of the game without options prevails -does not apply in the present environments: Although the bargaining game is not an ultimatum game a subgame perfect equilibrium in ultimatum strategies always exists. We now turn attention to the implications that equilibrium behavior within bargaining pairs has over market equilibria.
Consider a market pro le where all traders use ultimatum strategies: as proposers, agents offer a share equal to their partners market option, as responders they accept any offer of a share at least as great as their own market option, and in case of rejection all opt out. At this pro le all matched pairs trade and the market options and must satisfy and , where and denote the expected values of being in a bargaining pair at (before the proposer has been selected), respectively for buyers and sellers; and where are uniquely determined because all pairs trade immediately. Under ultimatum strategies, since buyers and sellers are chosen to be the initial proposer with equal probability, these expected values must solve and . Consequently, the market options must solve the following system of difference equations:
The following is proved in the Appendix: The outside options at , and , are simply the present value of the surplus exceeding the market options that each agent expects to appropriate from onwards.
As , and .
A unique market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies exists.
With the value of the market options at hand, we are ready to establish that the uniform pro le where all traders use ultimatum strategies is a market equilibrium:
Assume that all agents in the market play ultimatum strategies. Then the market options are uniquely given as in Lemma 3. Observe that since (which is shown to hold in the proof of Lemma 3), equation (1) implies that and . Thus, by Lemma 1, the pair of ultimatum strategies is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game for each match and thus the market pro le constitutes a market equilibrium.
Are there other market equilibria? By Proposition 2, when for all each bargaining pair must play ultimatum strategies. Hence, when the market options given in Lemma 3 satisfy the preceding condition, the market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies is the unique market equilibrium. That is, however, a very stringent condition. If it is not satis ed, other market equilibria -in which some traders use strategies that yield market options other than those of Lemma 3 -may exist. As long as the bargaining games with two-sided outside options admit a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria, it is possible that -in addition to the market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies -other market pro les can be sustained as market equilibria. To address this question we set upper and lower bounds to the payoffs that traders can attain in a market equilibrium.
At a market equilibrium, for each buyer-seller pair the bargaining game starting in period yields expected subgame perfect equilibrium values and , in and , where and ( and ) denote the supremum (in mum) of the payoffs that sellers and buyers can obtain at bargaining games starting at in any market equilibrium. Observe that in order to evaluate the extreme values that traders can attain at each in a market equilibrium there is no loss of generality if we restrict attention to uniform immediate agreement market pro les. The sequence is the same at all such market pro les, and it is uniquely determined by , the initial measures of buyers and sellers and the ows of entry. At a uniform pro le, at each , all buyers (and similarly all sellers) obtain the same market option if they abandon a bargaining match. These market options must lie in intervals and . Note that since the best market option cannot exceed the continuation payoffs obtained when, in the immediate posterior period, the best equilibrium outcome prevails in bargaining whenever a match occurs and the best continuation market option is obtained in the absence of a match. Moreover, since options are endogenously given and agents are always free to reenter the pool of unmatched agents the previous inequality cannot be strict; otherwise a superior market option would be attainable at , contradicting that is the upper bound of the market options at . We may reason similarly about the other bounds to conclude that (5) If the market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies is not the unique market equilibrium then, at a market equilibrium in uniform pro les, if sellers (buyers) obtain their best market option (respectively ) at all , buyers (sellers) must attain their worst market option (respectively ) at all . Consider a market pro le where the market options of the sellers are , while the options of the buyers are , . At such pro le buyers cannot be playing ultimatum strategies: By Proposition 2, market options and , different from the market options of the market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies, can be market equilibrium options only if the following are subgame perfect equilibrium strategies for each bargaining pair: as proposer, the seller gives the buyer only and threatens (credibly) to take the market option upon rejection; on the other side, buyers that act as rst proposers offer sellers their continuation value within the pair (because, given that their market option is just they cannot credibly threaten to opt out). That is, when the seller (buyer) is The unique solution to (7) such that and is where At any market equilibrium, the market options at each must lie in the intervals and , where is given by (8) .
selected as rst proposer, agents play a subgame perfect equilibrium with immediate agreement in which she obtains the maximum (minimum) payoff in the interval of payoffs of Proposition 2 i). Symmetric behavior must prevail in a market equilibrium where buyers obtain while sellers obtain . Thus the extreme expected values can be written in terms of the extreme options as (6) and substituting (6) in (5) we obtain (7) Our next result, Lemma 5 states that this system of difference equations has a unique solution that is admissible. The proof is in the Appendix. (8) The following proposition is now immediate.
∞ ∞

Proposition 7
Proof: , such that are market equilibrium options. Otherwise the market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies is the unique market equilibrium.
We say that the -when satis es for and for all . Our next result, Proposition 7, establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of market equilibria sustaining each of the payoffs within the bounds set in Proposition 6. This condition is that the sequences of pairs of market options combining the upper bound of one side of the market with the lower bound of the other side are -bounded.
Consider bargaining games with outside options and Observe that . By Proposition 2, with -bounded outside options , all and are expected gains attainable in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Pick a pro le where and and observe that the market options that arise under this pro le are and Symmetrically we may select market pro les that yield options to the buyers and to the sellers and that are a subgame perfect equilibrium of games with these outside options if and only if is -bounded. Hence, if and are -bounded they are market equilibrium sequences of options. Let us now explore how to sustain market equilibria with interior sequences of outside options , and , when and are -bounded. By Proposition 2, in a bargaining game with -bounded outside options , all and are expected gains attainable in subgame perfect equilibrium. On the other hand, if is a market equilibrium sequence of options sustained with a pro le that yields expected gains to all the sellers and to all the buyers, then the outside options are uniquely given by Market equilibria that yield intermediate sequences of options to the sellers have a direct interpretation: they are the result of a uniform pro le of strategies where responders obtain more that their market option. Alternatively, sellers might obtain because buyers play a non uniform pro le.
Consider a sequence of expected values and and write and to denote the associated market options. Since is a linear combination of and , and since and are bounded above by and , the necessary inequalities for -boundedness of hold. By Proposition 2 all values and are attainable as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs in a bargaining game with outside options . Observe that and Hence and Therefore is a market equilibrium sequence of options. To complete the proof let us check that -boundedness of both and is necessary. First note that each of these two sequences in turn must be a market equilibrium sequence of options. If is not -bounded there is a date such that and it is easy to check that the inequality at is maintained at posterior dates: and for all By Proposition 2 ultimatum strategies prevail as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for all pairs that meet at dates but a uniform market pro le in which all traders use ultimatum strategies from on cannot sustain as market equilibrium options. The same argument rules out a market equilibrium with options when this sequence is notbounded.
Proposition 7 implies that the market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies prevails uniquely even under con gurations for which individual bargaining pairs admit multiple subgame perfect equilibria: at these con gurations there are multiple subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for bargaining pairs, but only the market options of the ultimatum strategies are consistent with market equilibrium. Our next result, Proposition 8, characterizes parameter con gurations for which the market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies is the unique market equilibrium. For each initial population and entry ow of traders the following holds: i) Given the matching probability of the sellers there is a such that the market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies is the unique market equilibrium if and only if ; and ii) given the discount rate there is a , such that the market equilibrium in ultimatum strategies is the unique market equilibrium if and only if .
i) Observe that , , and are continuous in all parameters. For each con guration consider and observe that all the inequalities for -boundedness hold strictly in the limit. By continuity, for all parameter con gurations, there is such that all inequalities are preserved. Hence, for each parameter con guration there is a such that implies that and are the intervals of market equilibria.
ii) Simply observe that for each parameter con guration with there is a , ( It is now immediate that when players become arbitrarily patient and search frictions vanish it is not necessarily the case that expected prices in a market equilibrium approach , the Walrasian price.
In this section we look at the special case of markets where the measures of buyers and sellers remain at a steady state thanks to identical ows of entry in both sides of the market that exactly match the measure of realized trades (i.e. as in Rubinstein and Wolinsky
). An interpretation is that traders return to the market after each trade.
In a all relevant information about the market at each date can be summarized by and the constant matching probabilities of buyers and sellers and Since the primitives of the market are time independent, the range of (endogenously given) market options is time independent as well. Consequently, the market options of the sellers and the buyers at each , and must lie in the time independent intervals and . Proposition 10 characterizes market equilibria in the special case of stationary markets. Here the extent of multiplicity is greatly reduced: if frictions are not too great, a unique steady state market equilibrium à la Rubinstein and Wolinsky prevails. The basic intuition is that the shares that players obtain are determined by the value of the outside opportunities, and in a market where trades and entry keep the measure of buyers and sellers constant these outside opportunities offer positive prospects even to the short side of the market. ii) Otherwise each buyer-seller pair bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the responder is offered the value of her market option and she accepts. These options are:
See Appendix. The present characterization does not rely on a speci c functional form for the matching technology, and consequently a variety of asymptotic outcomes can be explored.
Observe that
If we let , and assume that for each state of the market the probability that sellers nd a match is unrelated to the cost of bargaining then we obtain that and That is the outcome highlighted by Rubinstein and Wolinsky : each side of the market appropriates a surplus share equal to the relative measure of the other side.
Other asymptotic outcomes are possible, though, if the matching probabilities are related to the delay caused by searching for a new partner in the market. For instance, agents might be constrained to contacting at most one potential partner per period, and only a portion of potential partners are available. In this case, and are no longer independent. As an example, let and . Now and When the market approaches a frictionless market (in the limit as ) the market options approach . In this example, the relative scarcity of sellers in the market is offset by the fact that 6 Conclusions search costs are always higher than the cost of delay inside a bargaining pair. Therefore, the relative bargaining power of both buyers and sellers is symmetric and the 50-50 split prevails (uniquely) regardless of the relative sizes of the two populations.
Two-sided and time-varying outside options have substantive consequences in bargaining games: Our predictions about isolated bargaining pairs are substantially less sharp than what is usual since the uniqueness of subgame perfect equilibrium -that prevails in bargaining without options -no longer holds. Moreover, in the context of a market, the outside options are endogenous. The greater complexity of the bargaining game and the endogenous nature of the outside options are not an obstacle for a complete and explicit characterization of market equilibria, even in non-stationary environments. Here, the outside option principle is no longer at work, all outside options are relevant and the range of prices depends fundamentally on the state of the market. When a unique non-stationary market equilibrium prevails, it is sustained by pro les of ultimatum strategies and its limit outcome as frictions vanish is Walrasian. However, since the bargaining game admits a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria, a continuum of market equilibria may prevail as well; and convergence to Walrasian prices is not assured. Therefore, in markets where buyer-seller pairs play alternating offer games with two-sided freedom to search, limit Walrasian outcomes when frictions vanish cannot be assured unless the restriction to ultimatum strategies is exogenously imposed.
Further research is needed to extend the present work to markets with heterogeneous buyers and sellers. In the present environment with homogeneous traders, even at non-Walrasian prices, efficiency (constrained to the feasibility imposed by the matching process) is ensured as long as all realized matches reach immediate agreement. As this no longer holds in markets with heterogeneous buyers and sellers, it is an open question whether inefficient market equilibria can be supported.
Exploration of markets with heterogeneous agents should also illuminate our intuition about stationary markets. As long as entry is exogenous, markets with homogeneous traders approach a stationary state only if equal numbers of buyers and sellers enter. A meaningful model of steady states It is immediate that must solve 3. Since all matches reach trade the measures of active traders at each date and the probabilities that searchers nd a partner are uniquely determined from the exogenous parameters of the market , and so is the sequence . By forward substitution of the sequence we obtain that must satisfy for all . Moreover, and hence
Observe that the sequence is such that for all and , and Therefore (11) yields a unique solution to (3) and for all . It is now straightforward that the unique solution to (1) must satisfy (2) .
(In what follows recall that , , and ) First note that and must solve independent linear difference equations. Any solution and is of the form where and are particular solutions; and no solution with is bounded. It is easy to verify that the values given in (8) are a particular solution and satisfy for all . Hence they are the unique admissible values for and Substituting these particular solutions into (7) yields (12) It is now an exercise to verify that (8) gives particular solutions that lie in . The uniqueness of a bounded solution follows since any solution must be of the form 
